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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the provision of enhanced communications between vehicles. It
is expected that vehicles will have several communication devices, and that a specialised
node will provide external connectivity to these devices, i.e. the devices in the vehicle form
a Mobile Network. We propose the use of Network Mobility communication solutions for
providing access from the vehicles to an infrastructured network (e.g., the Internet) or for
communication with other vehicles. The main contribution of this paper consists in a route
optimisation solution for mobile networks – based on the use of mixed ad-hoc and infras-
tructure communications – that enables inter-vehicle communications to be improved in
terms of bandwidth and delay. The mechanism provides the same level of security than
today’s IPv4 Internet, by means of reusing Mobile IPv6 security concepts, and the use of
public key cryptography and Cryptographically Generated Addresses. The proposed solu-
tion is characterised and evaluated through extensive simulation, showing that it provides
an efficient optimisation in vehicular communications.
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Figure 1. Some examples of applications and services in a vehicular scenario.
1 Introduction
Many people in modern societies spend a considerable amount of time in cars. Up
to now, vehicular communications have been mainly restricted to cellular commu-
nication networks. Enabling broader communication facilities in cars is an impor-
tant contribution to the global trend towards ubiquitous communications [1]. Ve-
hicles should provide access to the Internet and also communication among them-
selves, supporting new services and applications.
Examples of services and applications (see Figure 1) that are of interest for automo-
bile users are personal communication services, Internet access services, vehicular
specific services such as traffic information or car diagnosis activities, entertain-
ment services, and broadcast/multicast services. The provision of these services
and applications in a vehicular scenario poses some challenges that require to be
solved, mainly related to mobility management and security.
It is expected that several devices within a vehicle will likely benefit from hav-
ing Internet connectivity (the so-called car-to-Internet scenario): internal sensors,
on-board computers, infotainment back-seat boards, etc.; but also external devices,
such as laptops or PDAs, carried by passengers. Therefore, our architectural as-
responsibility for the content of this paper. The information in this document is provided
as is and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular
purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability.
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sumption is that networks will be deployed in cars, with specialised devices (Mo-
bile Routers) providing nodes of these networks with the external communication
access. A Mobile Router, as it will be described later, not only provides connectivity
to the network deployed in the car, but also manages transparently the mobility of
the whole network, without putting any additional requirements on the devices at-
tached to the mobile network. Since it is expected that in forthcoming 4G networks
multiple access technologies will be available, Mobile Routers will benefit from
this heterogeneity by having more than one network interface (e.g., GPRS/UMTS,
WLAN and Bluetooth, among others), allowing the Mobile Router to forward the
traffic through the most appropriate interface. As an example, in vehicular environ-
ments, the use of additional WLAN interfaces may allow the creation of multi-hop
ad-hoc networks by several vehicles, to optimise local (car-to-car) communica-
tions.
Besides the Internet access, there are several applications which involve a vehicle-
to-vehicle communication. This kind of scenario may be supported by using Net-
work Mobility solutions, so cars can communicate through the fixed infrastructure
but, in this case, when the cars are close enough, a further optimisation is possible,
namely to communicate directly using an ad-hoc network. In this way, better band-
width than the one in the communication through the infrastructure can be achieved.
Typically, this will be true even if we use a NEMO Route Optimisation solution for
the communication through the fixed Internet. The reason is that, although the num-
ber of hops can be similar, the communication with the infrastructure will typically
use a technology with lower bandwidth (for example, UMTS) than the ad-hoc net-
work (for example, WLAN). Also, the ad-hoc route will probably result in lower
costs.
This paper presents a Route Optimisation solution called Vehicular Ad-hoc Route
Optimisation for NEMO (VARON). VARON allows local car-to-car communica-
tions to be optimised, by enabling – in a secure way – the use of a Vehicular Ad-
hoc Network (VANET) for local communications among cars (instead of using the
infrastructure). In VARON, communications security in the ad-hoc network is pro-
vided through use of the infrastructure, guarantying that the peer available through
the ad-hoc network is the same that the one through the infrastructure. Besides, the
robustness of VARON against ad-hoc routing attacks is build on the hop-by-hop
authentication and message integrity of routing messages, and the use of Crypto-
graphically Generated Addresses. However, this involves a performance cost, since
cryptographic operations, such as signature generation/verification, consume time
and energy. This cost could be of some concern, specially in energy and resource
constrained devices. However, in the case of Mobile Routers deployed in cars, this
is not a big issue, since vehicles have a powerful and rechargeable source of energy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A brief summary of the back-
ground and related work is provided in Section 2. Section 3 describes the security
exploits that may appear in vehicular ad-hoc car-to-car optimisations. Our route op-
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Figure 2. Vehicular communications scenario.
timisation mechanism for vehicular environments, VARON, is described in detail
in Section 4. Section 5 evaluates VARON through simulations. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related work
This section summarises some of the concepts, terminology and related protocols
that are used through the paper, and the related work and motivation for optimisa-
tion mechanisms in inter-vehicle communication scenarios.
2.1 Enabling Internet connectivity in automobiles: Network Mobility
Figure 2 shows an example of a vehicular scenario, that involves both communi-
cations between nodes inside a vehicle and the Internet, also called car-to-Internet
communications (addressed in this section), and communications among vehicles,
called car-to-car communications (addressed in Section 2.2).
There are several approaches that may be used to enable Internet access from au-
tomobiles. Initially, only cellular radio technologies were taken into account [2].
More recently, with the success of the IEEE 802.11 WLAN technology, it is being
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investigated how to overcome the limitations of existing cellular radio networks
(e.g., cost, low bandwidth, high delay, etc.), by making use of this technology and
multi-hop ad-hoc protocols. As an example, the Drive-thru Internet project 3 pro-
posed an architecture based on the deployment of several roadside IEEE 802.11
Access Points (APs) to enable Internet access from passing-by vehicles. One of
the challenges posed by this architecture is that there could exist “holes” in the
connectivity, that would prevent vehicles from communicating. In [3], a solution to
mitigate this problem of intermittent connectivity is proposed, by means of a mech-
anism based on application gateways and proxies. Another drawback of this kind of
solution is that it does not support transparent mobility among different technolo-
gies (e.g., a handover from WLAN to UMTS when no WLAN APs are available).
The ability to switch among different access networks is critical for future 4G de-
ployments.
Vehicular communication scenarios involve groups of devices moving together, so
it seems more appropriate to use a network mobility approach [4], instead of host
centric solutions, that would force each device within a car to manage its own
connectivity to the Internet (including all the issues related to mobility).
The Network Mobility (NEMO) Basic Support protocol [5], proposed by the IETF 4 ,
extends the basic end-host mobility solution, Mobile IPv6 [6], to provide network
mobility support. In this solution, a mobile network (known also as Network that
Moves – NEMO 5 ) is defined as a network whose attachment point to the Internet
varies with time. The router within the NEMO that connects to the Internet is called
the Mobile Router (MR). It is assumed that the NEMO has a Home Network, con-
nected to the Internet, where it resides when it is not moving. Since the NEMO is
part of the Home Network, the Mobile Network Nodes (MNNs) have configured
addresses belonging to one or more address blocks assigned to the Home Net-
work: the Mobile Network Prefixes (MNPs). These addresses remain assigned to
the NEMO even when it is away from home. Of course, these addresses only have
topological meaning when the NEMO is at home. Thus, when the NEMO is away
from home, packets addressed to the Mobile Network Nodes will still be routed
to the Home Network. Additionally, when the NEMO is connected to a visited
network, the MR acquires an address from the visited network, called the Care-
of Address (CoA), where the routing architecture can deliver packets without any
additional mechanism.
The goal of the network mobility support mechanisms [7] is to preserve estab-
lished communications between the MNNs and their external Correspondent Nodes
(CNs) despite movement. Packets of such communications will be addressed to the
MNNs’ addresses, which belong to the MNP, so an additional mechanism to for-
3 http://www.drive-thru-internet.org/
4 http://www.ietf.org/
5 NEMO can mean NEtwork MObility or NEtwork that MOves according to the context.
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Figure 3. NEMO Basic Support protocol operation overview.
ward packets between the Home Network and the NEMO is defined. The basic
solution for network mobility support [5] essentially creates a bidirectional tunnel
between a special node located in the Home Network of the NEMO, called the
Home Agent (HA), and the Care-of Address of the MR (see Figure 3).
The NEMO Basic Support protocol [5] has the following limitations:
• It forces suboptimal routing, i.e. packets are always forwarded through the HA,
following a suboptimal path and therefore adding a delay in the packet delivery.
• It introduces non-negligible packet overhead, reducing the Path MTU (PMTU).
Specifically, an additional IPv6 header (40 bytes) is added to every packet be-
cause of the MR-HA bidirectional tunnel.
• The HA becomes a bottleneck for the communication as well as a potential single
point of failure. Even with a direct path available between an MNN and a CN,
if the HA (or the path between the CN and the HA or between the HA and the
MR) is not available, the communication is disrupted.
These problems are exacerbated when considering nested mobility (i.e. a mobile
network gains connectivity through other mobile networks), since in this case the
packets are forwarded through all the HAs of the upper level mobile networks in-
volved.
Because of these limitations, it is highly desirable to provide what has been called
Route Optimisation (RO) support for NEMO [8], to enable direct packet exchange
between a CN (that is, any communication peer on the Internet) and a Mobile Net-
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work Node (MNN), avoiding traversing the Home Network. There exist several
NEMO RO proposals [9], [10] that eliminate or mitigate the aforementioned prob-
lems, although many of them require changes in the operation (i.e. upgrading the
software) of CNs and/or MNNs and/or HAs. Furthermore, the additional load that
may be required to perform new mobility functionalities to support a NEMO Route
Optimisation mechanism, may be too high for certain devices within a car (e.g.,
sensors), because of their limited capabilities.
MIRON [11] is a proposal of a solution for Route Optimisation that does not require
upgrades in CNs, MNNs, or HAs. MIRON has two modes of operation:
• The MR performs all the Route Optimisation tasks on behalf of those nodes that
are not mobility capable – thus working as a Proxy MR [9].
• An additional mechanism, based on PANA [12] and DHCP [13], to support
mobility-capable hosts (i.e. Mobile Nodes attached to a NEMO) and routers (i.e.
nested Mobile Routers) that actually have mobility and Route Optimisation ca-
pabilities to manage their own Route Optimisation.
2.2 Optimising car-to-car communications
There exist several vehicular applications, such as multi-player gaming, instant
messaging, traffic information or emergency services, that might involve communi-
cations among vehicles that are relatively close each other (i.e. car-to-car commu-
nications) and may even move together (e.g., military convoys). These applications
are currently not well supported in vehicular scenarios.
Although automobiles can communicate with other vehicles through the infras-
tructure (the Internet) by means of the NEMO Basic Support protocol, they could
benefit from better bandwidth, delay and, most probably, cheaper communication,
by forming vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) and making use of the resulting
multi-hop network to directly communicate with each other. The challenge is to
achieve this direct communication through the VANET with a security level equiv-
alent to the one provided by today’s IPv4 fixed Internet.
VARON enables to optimise car-to-car communications in a secure way by combin-
ing a Network Mobility approach – used to support car-to-Internet communications
– with a vehicular ad-hoc approach – used when communication occurs between
vehicles that are close enough to communicate through an ad-hoc network formed
by the Mobile Routers deployed within those vehicles, and perhaps within other
vehicles in their surroundings.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one proposal, described in [14], that also
proposes the combination of NEMO and ad-hoc approaches. The proposed mecha-
nism in [14] assumes that each vehicle is a moving network and the performance of
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inter-vehicular communications is improved by creating and using a VANET. The
NEMO Basic Support protocol [5] is responsible for the provision of global Inter-
net connectivity to the moving network, whereas an ad-hoc routing protocol is run
among the Mobile Routers, creating an overlay VANET for inter mobile networks
connectivity. This scheme enables direct communication between cars’ devices that
belong to the same overlay VANET (direct route), whereas the NEMO Basic Sup-
port protocol is used otherwise (nemo route). The problem with [14] is that it does
not deal with the security aspects of the solution, and security is a critical issue for
the feasibility of these kind of solutions.
Security is one of the main issues of this kind of solution in car-to-car environ-
ments, since the use of ad-hoc communications could enable malicious nodes to
perform several types of attacks [15], such as stealing traffic or flooding a partic-
ular node. Next section describes the security challenges posed by the use of an
ad-hoc solution for direct car-to-car communications, summarising and classifying
the attacks that VARON aims at avoiding. As it will be explained in more detail in
Section 4, VARON benefits from the simultaneous reachability of vehicles through
the infrastructure and the ad-hoc network to secure the communications in the ad-
hoc part.
3 Exploits against vehicular ad-hoc car-to-car optimisations
By using a Vehicular Ad-hoc Network to route packets of a local car-to-car com-
munication, the performance of the communications in such a kind of scenario
may be greatly improved – in terms of bandwidth and delay – when compared to
data traversing an infrastructured network through a cellular radio network (e.g.,
UMTS). However, this kind of optimisation enables many different types of at-
tacks. In this section, we briefly describe some relevant examples of attacks that
would be possible if no additional mechanisms were used to secure this optimisa-
tion. This would help us introducing all the security problems that our proposal –
VARON (described in Section 4) – avoids.
There are several types of attacks that may be performed against a vehicular ad-hoc
car-to-car optimisation. Next, we describe the most relevant ones:
• Prefix ownership attacks. Devices within a vehicle form a mobile network, shar-
ing a prefix (the Mobile Network Prefix), which is managed by the Mobile Router
of the vehicle. It is necessary to provide Mobile Routers with a mechanism that
enables them to mutually verify that a Mobile Router actually manages the Mo-
bile Network Prefix it claims to (i.e. it is authorised to forward/receive packets
addressed from/to that MNP). Otherwise, a malicious node would be allowed to
spoof (“steal”) a certain prefix and get all the traffic addressed to this prefix from
other MRs connected to the ad-hoc network.
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• Ad-hoc routing attacks. The creation and maintenance of the ad-hoc routes to lo-
cally exchange traffic between MRs connected to the VANET, is a critical issue
from the security point of view. This task is performed by ad-hoc routing proto-
cols, which still suffer from a lot of vulnerabilities, mainly due to the unmanaged
and non-centralised nature of ad-hoc networks. Typical exploits against existing
ad-hoc routing protocols may be classified into the following categories [16]:
· Modification attacks. A malicious node can cause redirection of data traffic
or Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by introducing changes in routing control
packets or by forwarding routing messages with falsified values. As an example
of this attack, a malicious node M could prevent a legitimate node A from
receiving traffic from a node B by advertising a shorter route to B than the one
that the true next hop towards A advertises.
· Impersonation attacks. A malicious node can spoof the IP address of a legiti-
mate node, and therefore steal its identity, and then perform this attack com-
bined with a modification attack. The main problem of these attacks is that it
is difficult to trace them back to the malicious node.
· Fabrication attacks. A malicious node can create and send false routing mes-
sages. This kind of attack can be difficult to detect, since is not easy to verify
that a particular routing message is invalid, specially when it claims that a
neighbour cannot be reached.
Some ad-hoc secure protocols make impossible to perform some of these exploits
(such as ARAN [16]). However, there is no mechanism that combines in a secure
way a Network Mobility approach, to deal with the issue of vehicular global con-
nectivity, and a Vehicular Ad-hoc Network, to optimise local car-to-car communi-
cations. By security, we mean a mechanism that is not vulnerable in the previously
described ways.
4 Vehicular Ad-Hoc Route Optimisation for NEMO (VARON)
In this section we present a novel solution that provides Route Optimisation for
NEMO in vehicular environments, where a Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET)
may be securely created and used to optimise local communications among vehi-
cles.
It is assumed that the Mobile Router (MR) deployed in each vehicle will have at
least three network interfaces: one ingress interface to communicate with the nodes
inside the vehicle that belong to the NEMO (e.g., WLAN, Bluetooth), one or more
egress interfaces to connect to the Internet (e.g., UMTS, WiMAX, even WLAN in
some cases), and an additional ad-hoc interface (e.g., WLAN) to communicate with
neighbouring cars and set-up multi-hop networks (see Figure 2). Compared with a
normal Mobile Router (without any ad-hoc optimisation), only one (ad-hoc) addi-
tional interface is required. It is important to notice that Mobile Routers deployed
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in vehicles will not be much concerned about energy or processing constraints,
as opposed to personal mobile devices or other ad-hoc scenarios (such as sensor
networks).
It is also assumed that vehicle’s devices will be always able to communicate with
other vehicle’s devices through the Internet, by using the NEMO Basic Support
protocol. On the other hand, there may exist the possibility of enabling these de-
vices to directly communicate if a multi-hop vehicular ad-hoc network could be
set-up by the involved vehicles and other neighbouring cars. VARON aims at mak-
ing possible to benefit from this optimisation opportunity in a secure way.
In our proposal, VARON, the MR is the node in charge of performing the opti-
misation of the communications. The steps for carrying out this procedure are the
following:
(1) Discovery of reachable MNPs. The MR needs to find out which other MRs
are available within the VANET, that is, which Mobile Network Prefixes are
reachable through its ad-hoc interface.
(2) Creation of a secure ad-hoc route between the MRs of the mobile networks
that want to optimise the route they are using to exchange traffic. The ad-hoc
routing protocol used to create this route should provide certain security guar-
antees making impossible to perform any of the exploits described in Section
3. The mechanism used by VARON to set-up and maintain a secure ad-hoc
route is based on ARAN (Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc Networks) [16],
modified and extended to fulfil the requirements of our Network Mobility
based vehicular scenario.
Next, we describe in detail these two steps.
4.1 Discovery of reachable MNPs
Every MR announces its Mobile Network Prefix (MNP) by periodically broadcast-
ing – through the ad-hoc interface – a message, called Home Address Advertisement
(HoAA), that contains its Home Address and an associated lifetime, to allow this
information to expire. These messages are announced through the ad-hoc interface,
by using a hop-limited flooding, so every MR becomes aware of the MNPs that can
be reached through the VANET.
The MR’s HoA is chosen to belong to the NEMO’s Mobile Network Prefix. The
length of the MNP is fixed to 64 bits (/64) due to security reasons that will be
explained later. Hence, the MNP can be inferred directly from the HoA (it is the
network part of it). With the MRs’ announcements, every MR is aware of all the
MR’s HoAs (and associated Mobile Network Prefixes) that are available within the
ad-hoc network.
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Figure 4. Care-of Route discovery and validation.
4.2 Creation of a secure ad-hoc route
4.2.1 Building the ad-hoc route
In case a Mobile Router detects that there is an ongoing communication between a
node attached to it and a node attached to another MR that is available through the
VANET and this communication is decided to be optimised (how this decision is
taken is out of the scope of this paper), the MR needs to build a multi-hop route to
send packets directly through the ad-hoc network.
An example (Figure 4) is used to illustrate in more detail the proposed mecha-
nism. A device (e.g., a back-seat embedded video game system) in car A is com-
municating with another device in car B 6 . This communication is initially being
forwarded through the Internet, following the suboptimal path determined by the
NEMO Basic Support protocol, thus traversing Home Networks A and B before
being delivered to the destination. We call this route Home Route. By listening to
the announcements received in the ad-hoc interface, MR A becomes aware that
the destination of such communication may be also reachable through a VANET
formed by neighbouring VARON enabled vehicles. Then, MR A may decide to
start using the vehicular ad-hoc network to route this traffic, instead of sending it
through the Internet.
6 Another example could be a car A from an emergency service convoy communicating
with another emergency car B.
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Figure 5. Simplified overview of CGA creation and structure.
The first step in this optimisation process is that MR A must learn and set-up a
bidirectional route through the vehicular ad-hoc network to MR B (the MR claim-
ing to manage MNP B). We call this route Care-of Route. For doing this, MR A
(the originator MR) sends – through its ad-hoc interface – a Care-of Route Test Init
(CoRTI) message (Table 1 summarises our notation) to its one-hop neighbours:
A → one-hop neighbours :
[CoRTI, HoAB, NA, HoAA, KA+]KA−
This message includes, besides the identifier of the message (CoRTI), the final
destination MR’s HoA (HoAB), a nonce NA (to uniquely identify a CoRTI message
coming from a source; every time an MR initiates a route discovery, it increases the
nonce), the IP address of MR A (HoAA) and its public key (KA+), all signed with
the MR A’s private key (KA−). When an MR receives through its ad-hoc interface
a CoRTI message, it sets up a reverse route back to HoAA (MR A’s HoA), by
recording the MR from which it received the message (so it knows how to send a
reply in case it receives a message that has to be sent back to HoAA). In order to
authenticate the message, a mechanism that securely binds the IP address of MR A
(HoAA) with KA+ is needed. One possibility is to use certificates issued by a third
trusted party, as proposed in ARAN [16], but this solution seems unfeasible for
vehicular environments. Instead, this secure binding is obtained by using a special
type of addresses: Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs) [17].
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) are basically IPv6 addresses for
which the interface identifier is generated by computing a cryptographic one-way
hash function from a public key and the IPv6 prefix 7 . The binding between the
7 There are additional parameters that are also used to build a CGA, in order to enhance
privacy, recover from address collision and make brute-force attacks unfeasible. We inten-
tionally skip these details. The interested reader may refer to [17] for the complete proce-
dure of CGA generation.
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KA+ Public Key (and CGA related information) of MR A
KA− Private Key of MR A
[d]KA− Data d digitally signed by MR A
NA Nonce issued by MR A
HoAA Home Address of MR A
CoRTI Care-of Route Test Init message type
CoRT Care-of Route Test message type
CoRE Care-of Route Error message type
Table 1
Table of variables and notation.
public key and the address can be verified by re-computing the hash function and
comparing the result with the interface identifier (see Figure 5). In this way, if
the HoA used by MRs is a CGA, a secure binding between the MR’s HoA and the
MR’s public key is provided, without requiring any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
to be available. Notice that by itself, CGAs do not provide any guarantee of prefix
ownership, since any node can create a CGA from any particular Mobile Network
Prefix by using its own public-private key pair. But a node cannot spoof the CGA
that another node is legitimately using, because it does not have the private key
associated with the public key of that IP address.
A receiving MR (e.g., MR X in Figure 4) uses MR A’s public key (included in the
message) to validate the signature, then appends its own public key (KX+) to the
message, and signs it using its private key (KX−). The signature prevents spoofing
or message modification attacks, that may alter the route or form loops. Then, it
forwards the CoRTI message:
X → one-hop neighbours :
[
[CoRTI, HoAB, NA, HoAA, KA+]KA− , KX+
]
KX−
Upon receiving this CoRTI message from neighbour MR X, MR Y verifies the
signatures from the originator MR A and the neighbour MR X, stores the received
nonce to avoid reply attacks and adds a route to HoAA through HoAX (MR X).
Then, the signature and public key of the neighbour MR X are removed, and MR
Y appends its own public key, signs the message, and forwards it:
Y → one-hop neighbours :
[
[CoRTI, HoAB, NA, HoAA, KA+]KA− , KY +
]
KY−
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This last step is repeated by any intermediate node along the path until the CoRTI
message reaches the destination (the target MR, MR B) or the allowed hop limit
expires. Notice that MR B, after receiving the CoRTI message, has the guarantee
that only the node that has the private key associated with HoAA (KA−) could have
sent the CoRTI message.
Once MR B receives the CoRTI message, it generates a reply message (including
the received nonce NA), called Care-of Route Test (CoRT), and unicasts it back
following the previously learnt reverse path to the originator (MR A):
B → Y :
[CoRT, HoAA, NA, HoAB, KB+]KB−
Each node in the reverse path performs a procedure similar to the one performed
forwarding the CoRTI: the first MR in the reverse path that forwards the message
(i.e. MR Y) verifies the signature and, if correct, adds its public key KY +, signs the
message and sends it to the next MR in the path:
Y → X :
[
[CoRT, HoAA, NA, HoAB, KB+]KB− , KY +
]
KY−
MR X also sets up a reverse route back to MR B’s HoA by recording the MR from
which it received the message.
The remaining MRs in the reverse multi-hop route, when receiving the CoRT mes-
sage, verify the signature of the previous MR, remove it and the associated public
key, add their public key, sign the message, forward it to the next MR, and set-up
the reverse route. In the example, when MR X receives the message from MR Y, it
sends the following to MR A:
X → A :
[
[CoRT, HoAA, NA, HoAB, KB+]KB− , KX+
]
KX−
When the originator MR (MR A in the example) receives the CoRT message, it
verifies the signature and nonce returned by the destination MR (MR B). Once this
procedure is completed, MR B has successfully established a route with MR A
within the multi-hop vehicular ad-hoc network. This route is basically a temporal
path (Care-of Route) to reach MR B’s HoA, additional to the default route that MR
A may always use to send packets towards MR B (through the Internet, using the
Home Route), and vice-versa.
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Figure 6. Care-of Route authentication signalling.
4.2.2 Authenticating the Care-of Route
The Care-of Route cannot be used to forward packets between NEMO A and
NEMO B yet, since it has not been proved either that MR A manages MNP A,
or that MR B manages MNP B. Only the validity of a route to a node (B and A)
with an address (HoAB and HoAA) for which the node has the respective private
key has been proved to MR A and MR B. It has not been verified that MR A and
MR B are actually the routers authorised to manage MNP A and MNP B, respec-
tively. Without further verification, nothing could prevent an MR from stealing a
mobile network’s traffic. For example, a malicious node could be able to claim the
ownership of a given IP address (an address belonging to MNP A) and steal packets
addressed to that prefix (MNP A). This issue is similar to that of Route Optimisa-
tion in Mobile IPv6, where a mechanism is required to enable the Mobile Node to
prove that it owns both the Care-of Address and the Home Address.
The Return Routability procedure defined for Mobile IPv6 is based on two mes-
sages sent by the CN, one sent to the Mobile Node’s Home Address and the other
to Mobile Node’s Care-of Address. Based on the content of the received messages,
the Mobile Node sends a message to the Correspondent Node [6], [15]. By properly
authenticating the message, this procedure is enough to prove that the Mobile Node
has received both messages and therefore it has been assigned (that is, owns) both
the Home Address and the Care-of Address at that time.
In VARON, we borrow from the Return Routability (RR) procedure some of the
underlying security concepts. With the RR, the Correspondent Node is provided
with a mechanism to verify that a Mobile Node is able to send and receive packets
from two different addresses. In VARON, what is needed is to provide a pair of end-
point MRs (which are communicating with each other through the Home Route)
with a mechanism to verify that the multi-hop route within the VANET connects
each of them with the same network (the respective MNP) that each MR can reach
through the infrastructure when communicating with any address within the MNP
of the other MR. In this way, the two end-point MRs may choose to use that Care-of
Route instead of the Home Route.
The essence of the Care-of Route authentication procedure in VARON is that the
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two end-point MRs involved in a particular Route Optimisation procedure request
each other to verify that the VANET Care-of Route may be used to send traffic
between the two NEMOs. This is done (see Figure 6) as follows:
• Each Mobile Router generates a key, Kmr, which can be used with any other
MR. In addition, the MR generates nonces at regular intervals. These nonces 8
and Kmr will be used to generate a security association between the two end-
points MRs.
• Each MR creates two tokens and sends each of them through one of the pos-
sible routes (Care-of and Home routes). Tokens are generated from Kmr and a
particular nonce.
• The first part of the Care-of Route authentication procedure is done at the same
time – and using the same messages – as the Care-of Route setup (described in
section 4.2.1). The first token, called Care-of keygen token, is sent piggybacked
in the CoRTI message, plus a Care-of cookie, and the index of the nonce used
to generate the token. The correspondent MR replies in the CoRT message, in-
cluding its own Care-of keygen token, its nonce index and copying the cookie
received in the CoRTI message.
• The second token, called Home keygen token, is sent, plus a Home cookie and
a nonce index, in a separate message, called Home Route Test (HoRT), through
the MR-HA tunnel (protected by IPsec ESP in tunnel mode) configured by the
NEMO Basic Support protocol, using the routing infrastructure. In order to ver-
ify that the correspondent MR is actually managing the IPv6 network prefix it
claims to, that is, the Mobile Network Prefix assigned to the NEMO, the HoRT
message is sent to a random address within the MNP. The MR that manages the
prefix has to intercept 9 that message therefore showing that it actually manages
the MNP 10 . The Mobile Network Prefix length used by VARON MRs is fixed to
64 bits (/64), in order to avoid a malicious node to “steal” a prefix. Otherwise, for
instance, if an MR was assigned a /64 prefix, then with probability 1/2 it could
try to spoof a /63 prefix (and steal its ”neighbours” packets). By fixing the MNP
length, this attack is no longer feasible.
As in the case of the Care-of Route test, the correspondent MR replies this
message with another HoRT message, including its own Home keygen token
and nonce index, and copying the received cookie.
• Each MR uses the received Home and Care-of keygen tokens to create a key,
Kbm that can be used to authenticate a Mobile Network Prefix Binding Update
8 Note that these nonces are different from the ones used during the ad-hoc route discovery
and setup procedure.
9 It is not required the MR to continuously examine every received packet in order to
intercept HoRT messages. The MR may start inspecting packets after sending (or receiving)
a CoRT message.
10 This test does not guarantee that a node manages a certain prefix, but that this node is at
least in the path toward that prefix. This provides the solution with a similar security level
that today’s IPv4 Internet has.
16
(MNPBU) message 11 – sent along the Care-of Route –, that enables the other
MR to check that the Mobile Network (MNP) reachable through the VANET
(Care-of Route) is the one reachable through the infrastructure. This verification
can be done because each MR has the information required to produce the key
when the MNPBU is received, and therefore authenticate the message.
At this point VARON signalling has finished. MR A has found out that MR B –
which owns HoAB and its associated private key and that is reachable through
the VANET – is also capable of receiving and sending packets sent to any address
from the Mobile Network Prefix (MNP) B through the infrastructure. This only
happens if the HA responsible of routing packets addressed to this MNP (that is,
HA B) is forwarding to MR B those packets addressed to MNP B. HA B only would
be doing that if proper authentication has taken place and MR B is authorised to
manage MNP B. The same guarantee also holds for MR B regarding MNP A and
MR A.
The Care-of Route authentication mechanism performed in VARON, as the Return
Routability procedure defined in Mobile IPv6, implicitly assumes that the fixed
routing infrastructure is secure and trusted. As long as this is true, the mechanism
defined is appropriate to secure the Mobile Network Prefix Binding Update, since
it does not introduce any new vulnerabilities that were not possible in today’s IPv4
Internet.
Once the process has been completed, the end-point MRs (MR A and MR B) may
exchange traffic using the set-up Care-of Route within the VANET.
4.2.3 Optimised routing using the VANET
Once the Care-of Route authentication procedure has finished, all MRs involved
in the creation of the ad-hoc route can forward packets to the HoAs of the end-
point MRs (see an example in Figure 7). However, only the end-point MRs have
verified the association of the corresponding MR’ HoA and the respective MNP.
Intermediate MRs (i.e. MR X and MR Y in the example) have only learnt host
routes towards the Home Addresses of the two end-point MRs (i.e. HoAA and
HoAB). In order to route data traffic between cars’ nodes with addresses belonging
to MNP A and MNP B, each end-point has to tunnel the packets towards the other
MR’s HoA, through the VANET route. In this way, intermediate MRs in the ad-hoc
route just forward the packets based on the host routes (with the end-point MRs’
HoAs as destination) added to their routing tables during the ad-hoc Care-of Route
11 The generation of this key (Kbm) and the keygen tokens, and the authentication of the
message follow the same mechanisms that the Return Routability procedure [6], [15] and
the proposal to extend it to support network prefixes [18]. We explicitly avoid these details
to make the paper more readable (the interested reader may refer to [6], [15] for additional
information).
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Figure 7. Overview of packet routing within the VANET.
creation process (see Figure 7).
The Care-of Route discovery and validation signalling is repeated periodically, both
to refresh the ad-hoc routes and to avoid time-shifting attacks. If an ad-hoc route
becomes invalid (for example, because it expires) or it is broken, and traffic is
received through this route, a Care-of Route Error (CoRE) message is sent (and
forwarded) by each MR in the path to the source MR. For example, if intermediate
MR Y in Figure 7 receives data traffic from MR A addressed to MR B and the
link between MR Y and the next hop towards MR B (in this case, MR B itself) is
broken, then MR Y sends a CoRE message to the next MR along the path towards
the source MR (MR A), which is MR X, indicating that there is a problem with this
Care-of Route:
Y → X :
[CoRE, HoAA, HoAB, NY , KY +]KY−
This message is received by MR X, which after verifying the authenticity of the
received CoRE, signs the message, adds its public key KX+ and the signature to
the message (as performed by intermediate MRs when processing and forwarding
CoRTI and CoRT messages) and sends it to the next hop towards MR A.
Y → X :
[
[CoRE, HoAA, HoAB, NY , KY +]KY− , KX+
]
KX−
Upon reception of this error message, the source MR (MR A in the example)
switches to use the Home Route for sending packets and it may start a new route
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discovery procedure to set-up a new optimised Care-of Route within the VANET.
To avoid DoS attacks, a CoRE message indicating that a route has become invalid
is only processed by an MR if the neighbour that is forwarding the message is the
next hop of this route. Otherwise, malicious nodes would be able to set as invalid
any Care-of Route.
There exist several possible mechanisms that can be used to detect that a Care-
of Route is no longer working. As an example, Mobile Routers may check if the
data packets forwarded within the VANET have been correctly received by the next
hop making use of link layer acknowledgement frames (if the MAC layer supports
that). If several data frames have not been acknowledged, this may be used as an
indication that the next hop is no longer reachable and therefore the Care-of Route
is broken.
4.3 Security Analysis
A malicious node M could attempt several attacks to this scheme. Basically, there
are two main types of attacks: those that try to modify the routing in the VANET,
and those that try to steal a prefix. In order to modify the ad-hoc routing, an attacker
out of the routing path could try to alter or fabricate routing messages. Such kind of
attack is not feasible because all routing messages are cryptographically signed. An
additional attack could be to try to impersonate a legitimate node (spoofing its IP
address), but this is not possible either, since the authenticity of a message is guar-
anteed by the use of CGAs and public key cryptography. Two possible examples of
these attacks are described next.
A malicious node M can try to change an already established ad-hoc route by send-
ing a CoRTI message to an MR X that belongs to this multi-hop route, claiming that
M can reach a certain MR A. But X will not accept the message if it cannot validate
it with the public key corresponding to the HoA of MR A associated with the route.
Because M cannot create that part of the CoRTI message, it can try to copy it from
a real CoRTI message previously sent by MR A, but the nonce included will not be
greater than the one stored in MR X that is associated with the route. Notice that a
legitimate update of the route by MR A is allowed because it knows its own private
key and the nonce that must be included in the CoRTI message.
A malicious node M that receives a CoRTI message from an MR A could try to
claim to a neighbour MR X that it is MR Z and not M (when sending the CoRTI
message towards MR B). If MR Z is a legitimate network node, this could mean
that afterwards all the traffic will be sent to it (DoS attack). But M will not be able
to do that because it does not have the private key associated with the HoA that MR
Z is using.
One example of an attack based on spoofing a prefix will be as follows. A malicious
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node M could create a HoA belonging to the MNP managed by a legitimate MR
A. The node M can create the HoA belonging to the MNP of MR A using its own
public key so it can prove to other nodes that it has the private key corresponding
to that address. However, the Home Route Test will fail, so it cannot make another
MR send to it the traffic addressed to the MNP of MR A. In this situation, the node
M can set-up an ad-hoc route for its HoA (using its own private key), since the
routes created in the VANET only define the forwarding of packets addressed to
MRs’ HoAs (see Figure 7). Therefore, different routes for HoAs belonging to the
same prefix could coexist (although only one at most will belong to non-malicious
nodes). However, only legitimate end-point MRs will success in performing the
Home Route Test and, therefore, will be able to generate and send a valid MNPBU
(enabling the use of the Care-of Route). Notice that packets sent to a legitimate
IP address equal to a HoA used by a malicious node to create an ad-hoc route,
will reach the intended destination because they will traverse the ad-hoc network
encapsulated inside a tunnel with the legitimate HoA.
There are some vulnerabilities and attacks that are still possible, resulting from the
inherent nature of ad-hoc networks, such as certain Denial-of Service (DoS) – e.g.,
based on non-collaborating nodes – or route discovery flooding attacks. But, notice
that VARON nodes can always revert communications to the Home Route in case
of the Care-of Route is not working.
5 Performance of VARON
In order to complete our discussion about the proposed solution, an extensive simu-
lation study was performed. Besides analysing the performance and costs of VARON,
the value of some metrics using VARON are compared to the ones obtained when
plain NEMO Basic Support protocol [5] or MIRON [11] (as an example of a non
ad-hoc Route Optimisation for NEMO) were used.
5.1 Computational cost
Each VARON Mobile Router must perform several cryptographic operations (such
as signing and verifying signatures) on each signalling message along a Care-of
Route. These cryptographic operations are relatively expensive, especially when
compared to the operation of the NEMO Basic Support protocol and other (inse-
cure) ad hoc routing protocols, that do very little (almost negligible) computation
per signalling message. However, it is important to note that only the routing con-
trol messages that make the state of the MR change or the MR perform an ac-
tion (e.g., modifying the routing table, forwarding a message, etc.) are subject to
signing/verifying. The signature of those routing messages that are discarded (e.g.,
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because they have been already processed and are received again forwarded by a
different MR) is not verified. Data packets exchanged between nodes after a route
has been set up are not processed by VARON either.
In order to evaluate the computational cost of VARON, several tests were con-
ducted, measuring the raw processing time expended on each of the operations
performed when processing VARON routing packets for different key sizes. The
cryptographic functions were implemented making use of the OpenSSL Library 12 ,
which provides functions for general purpose cryptographic tasks such as pub-
lic and private key encryption/decryption and signature creation/verification. The
measurements were conducted in two different types of devices that are likely to
play the role of a vehicular Mobile Router: a Linksys WRT54GS router (which is
a small home and office broadband router, equipped with a 200 MHz processor, an
IEEE 802.11g WLAN interface and an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet interface connected to
a VLAN capable 5-port switch) and a laptop (Intel Core-duo 2.0 GHz with 2 GB
RAM).
The processing performed by an MR on VARON control packets is composed of
some of the following operations (depending on the VARON message, not all of
them are performed on each packet):
• CGA verif.: Verification of the CGA. If the message has been forwarded by an
intermediate MR, the CGAs of both the original sender and the forwarder have
to be checked.
• Sign. verif. 1: Verification of the signature of the sender MR.
• Sign. verif. 2: Verification of the signature of the forwarder MR (in case of the
message has been forwarded by an intermediate MR).
• Sign. comp. 1: Computation of the signature by the sender MR when a new
message is generated (e.g., a CoRTI/CoRT message).
• Sign. comp. 2: Computation of the signature by an intermediate MR when a
message has to be forwarded (e.g., a CoRTI/CoRT message).
Table 2 shows the results for each of the cryptographic operations that are involved
in the processing of VARON routing messages. The processing time for the laptop
and the Linksys router were measured over three different RSA key sizes: 512, 768,
and 1024 bits. For both devices, an increase in the key size of 256 bits results in
approximately doubling the signature computation processing. The time required
to verify a signature or a CGA is almost negligible compared to the time required to
compute signatures, as expected, because of the nature of public key cryptography.
It is also interesting, although not very surprising, the difference in processing times
between the laptop and the Linksys router. For each key size, the processing time
is between 10 and 20 times slower on the router than on the laptop. The results
obtained for the Linksys router for the 1024-bit RSA key have been used as input
12 http://www.openssl.org/
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RSA key Average ± Std. Dev. (ms)
size (bits) CGA verif. Sign. verif. 1 Sign. verif. 2 Sign. comp. 1 Sign. comp. 2
Laptop
512 0.47 ± 0.05 0.42 ± 0.05 0.40 ± 0.02 2.36 ± 0.09 2.46 ± 0.20
768 0.47 ± 0.02 0.52 ± 0.04 0.52 ± 0.01 5.09 ± 0.16 5.13 ± 0.43
1024 0.59 ± 0.16 0.87 ± 0.05 0.89 ± 0.09 12.03 ± 0.27 11.94 ± 0.36
Linksys
512 13.58 ± 0.07 11.06 ± 0.06 11.08 ± 0.07 45.90 ± 0.37 45.86 ± 0.28
768 14.08 ± 0.93 12.72 ± 0.71 12.57 ± 0.43 79.86 ± 0.78 80.64 ± 1.31
1024 13.73 ± 0.38 14.47 ± 0.06 14.52 ± 0.08 136.61 ± 0.41 136.66 ± 0.44
Table 2
Raw time required to perform the cryptographic operations required when processing
VARON signalling packets.
to the simulations described in the next section. This will provide us with more
realistic results (that can be considered as a lower bound on the performance if
more powerful devices were used instead).
5.2 Simulation of VARON
We performed our simulations using OPNET 13 . We simulated 50 vehicles within
a road. Each vehicular MR is equipped, in addition to the ingress interface (to
provide connectivity to the vehicular devices), with an emulated UMTS egress in-
terface (1 Mbit/s, 150 ms of average one-way delay) and an IEEE 802.11 (WLAN)
interface (2 Mbit/s, transmission power of 1 mW, receiver sensitivity of -95 dBm)
in ad-hoc mode. The UMTS interface has been emulated because OPNET UMTS
models did not properly support IPv6 at the time of performing the simulations.
The UMTS channel has been modelled using a 1 Mbit/s WLAN 802.11b network,
with an additional delay of 150 ms per way. The link delay has been chosen based
on previous practical measurements [19], [20], [21]. In order to achieve global cov-
erage, the transmission power of the WLAN nodes (MRs and the Access Point)
that emulates the UMTS was set to 1 W. Considering the kind of analysis that we
were interested in performing, this set-up provided us with a reasonable model of a
UMTS network.
The UMTS interface provides continuous Internet connectivity, whereas the WLAN
interface enables forming multi-hop vehicular ad-hoc networks. UMTS and WLAN
13 OPNET University Program, http://www.opnet.com/services/
university/
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were chosen for the simulations because they are probably the most realistic candi-
date access technologies for a vehicular communication scenario nowadays. How-
ever, different technologies may also be used by VARON (e.g., IEEE 802.16e
WiMAX for the MR’s egress interface), since the protocol is independent of the
access technology used by the Mobile Router.
In order to evaluate the worst case scenario, VARON was simulated using 1024 bit
RSA keys and the processing time results shown in Table 2 for the Linksys router
as input for the simulations. All the VARON protocol, but the detection of broken
links and the generation of CoRE messages, was implemented using the OPNET
simulator 14 . By not implementing the detection of broken routes, a Care-of Route
entry can only be removed from the IP routing table of an MR when it expires 15 .
Hence, it may happen that an MR tries to use a broken Care-of Route for some time
(until it expires), since MRs along the path are not able to detect a broken route and
therefore they do not send any CoRE message to the source MR – that would make
it stop sending the traffic through the VANET and revert to use the Home Route.
Thus, VARON performance obtained from the simulation results is worse than the
one that would be obtained if the protocol were completely implemented.
A random delay uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 second was added before
forwarding a HoAA message in order to minimise collisions. This random delay
was introduced because it was observed that the performance when HoAA mes-
sages were forwarded immediately after their reception was quite poor. This is
related to the 802.11 MAC protocol, which does not perform a ready-to-send/clear-
to-send (RTS/CTS) exchange for broadcast packets, and therefore does not prevent
high probabilities of collision of broadcast packets from appearing in relatively
dense networks such as the simulated one (50 nodes).
In order to evaluate the performance of VARON under different real-case scenarios,
VARON experiments were performed varying the following two parameters:
a) Vehicle speed. Different simulations were run for average vehicle speeds of
1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 50, 70, 90, 100 and 120 16 km/h. The speed of a node is a
random variable, uniformly distributed between 0.9v and 1.1v, where v is one
of the previous mean speed values. Therefore, in each simulation, nodes have
different speeds, but still very similar. This represents real life scenarios, such
as vehicles in a city or motorway, where the relative speed of vehicles moving
in the same direction is low.
14 VARON model has approximately 10000 lines of code.
15 In the simulations, Care-of routes were marked as expired after 20 seconds. Expired
Care-of routes are not kept in the IP routing table for 10 additional seconds, so there is
enough time for the Mobile Router to refresh the Care-of Route (in case there is data traffic
being delivered using this route). These values were chosen after performing several sets
of simulations aimed at finding good values for these parameters.
16 The maximum speed limit in Spain is 120 km/h.
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b) Initial vehicle density. Different simulations were run for initial vehicle den-
sities of 200, 100, 50, 25, 20, 13.33, 10, 8, 6.67, 5, 4 and 3.33 vehicles/km 17 .
For each combination of the previous parameters, thirty different simulations were
performed, changing the speeds and initial positions of the vehicles, as well as the
seed of the random number generator of the simulator. The following metrics were
evaluated:
(1) Average end-to-end throughput. This is the mean TCP throughput obtained
when performing bulk file transfers. This evaluates the improvement in terms
of throughput obtained when using VARON, as well as the possible effects
that the use of VARON may have in TCP (e.g., due to the Home ↔ Care-of
Route handovers).
(2) Average Care-of Route acquisition latency. This is the average delay be-
tween the sending of a Care-of Route Test Init packet by an originator MR for
discovering and establishing a Care-of Route to a target MR, and the receipt of
the Mobile Network Prefix Binding Update message that makes the MR add a
Care-of Route entry to its IP routing table. This includes the delays of the sig-
nalling messages sent through the VANET (CoRTI, CoRT and MNPBU), the
processing time due to the cryptographic operations performed on each rout-
ing message and the delay due to the use of the infrastructure (Home Route)
to send HoRT messages.
(3) Average Care-of Route length. This is the average length of the Care-of
Route discovered and set-up by VARON. It is calculated by averaging the
number of hops taken by MNPBU messages to reach their destination (the
path followed by an MNPBU message is the same that the one that data pack-
ets sent through the VANET would follow afterwards).
(4) Average frequency of route changes. This is the average number of Home↔
Care-of Route changes per minute. This evaluates the stability of the Care-of
routes discovered by VARON.
(5) Average Care-of Route data packet fraction. This is the fraction of deliv-
ered data packets that are sent through a Care-of Route. This evaluates the
fraction of data traffic that is actually forwarded through an optimised route,
and therefore the likelihood of using VARON to optimise a traffic communi-
cation between two vehicles that are relatively close each other.
(6) Average VARON signalling load (bytes). This is the ratio of overhead bytes
to delivered data bytes using a Care-of Route. This metric was measured
counting the amount of VARON signalling bytes received at a Mobile Router
and the amount of data bytes received through the Care-of Route (data packets
received through the Home Route were not taken into account for this calcu-
lation).
17 This means that at the beginning of each simulation, the 50 nodes were uniformly dis-
tributed within a road of a length of 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 2.5, 3.75, 5, 6.25, 7.5, 10, 12.5 and 15
km, respectively, and then they started to move at their respective speeds.
24
(7) Average VARON signalling load (packets). Similar to the previous metric,
but a ratio of signalling packets to data packets overhead.
On each simulation only two nodes out of the 50 were communicating each other.
Simulations involving more nodes communicating simultaneously were also per-
formed to validate the correct operation of the solution. The throughput and sig-
nalling load metrics were obtained simulating a scenario in which a 2 MByte file
is transferred from a vehicle to another, using FTP. For the rest of the metrics, the
scenario consisted of a UDP VoIP flow (GSM, 24.2 kbit/s, 50 packets per second)
sent from a vehicle to another.
To simulate the delay added by the use of the NEMO Basic Support protocol [5]
and the traversal of the respective Home Networks of the involved vehicles, an ad-
ditional delay (one-way) of 36 ms was introduced in the infrastructure network.
This additional latency represents the delay required to go through two Home Net-
works located in Europe (the value was chosen based on real RTT measurements 18
obtained from the PingER project [22]).
5.3 Simulation results
Simulation results are presented next in Figures 8-13. Results are plotted using
three-dimensional graphs, so the impact of the vehicle density and speed on each
of the simulated metrics can be easily evaluated. Each data point is an average
of thirty simulations run with different randomly generated mobility patterns (but
following the considerations described above about speed and movement within a
road).
Figure 8 shows the average route acquisition latency, that is the time taken by
VARON to find and set-up a Care-of Route. VARON requires each MR along the
path to perform several cryptographic operations when processing a control packet,
such as the verification and generation of digital signatures and CGAs. This is com-
putationally demanding and therefore adds additional delay to the overall route ac-
quisition time. Another source of latency in the route acquisition time is the use of
the infrastructure network (i.e. Home Route) in the Care-of Route validation pro-
cess, that causes an additional delay – equal to the sum of the RTTs of each MR
to its respective HA – in the Care-of Route discovery time. Therefore, the route
acquisition time is higher in VARON than in other ad-hoc routing protocols, al-
though in VARON this time does not have a direct impact on normal data packet
forwarding, as data traffic delivery is guaranteed by the use of the Home Route.
Since an important contribution to the overall route acquisition time comes from
the cryptographic operations performed on each hop, this time is higher when the
vehicle density decreases, because in a less populated VANET, the average number
18 Available at http://www-iepm.slac.stanford.edu/pinger/
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Figure 8. Average Care-of Route acquisition latency.
of intermediate MRs involved in a communication is higher (this will be shown
later in Figure 9). However, if the average distance between vehicles is too high
(that is, the vehicle density is quite low), this may lead to the situation where only
direct 1-hop communications are possible (this explains why the route acquisition
time decreases for very low vehicle densities).
Vehicle speed has also an effect on the Care-of Route acquisition time – although
this effect is minor than the vehicle density – especially in highly populated sce-
narios. This effect is caused by the fact that it is more likely that more intermediate
nodes are required to participate in the Care-of Route in high speed scenarios, since
the distance between two vehicles that are communicating increases (because the
relative speed of the vehicles is higher than in low mobility scenarios 19 ).
Figure 9 shows the average Care-of Route length. The results shown in this graph
basically confirm what has been discussed in the previous paragraph, that is, the
strong dependency that the route acquisition time has on the number of hops of
the Care-of Route. Since the delay caused by the HoRT messages traversing the
infrastructure is the same for each route, independently of its length, the cost of
performing cryptographic operations on each hop is an important factor in the route
acquisition time. Obtained results show that for highly populated scenarios, two
MRs within the VANET are able to communicate directly almost always. For very
low populated scenarios, the average number of hops of a Care-of Route decreases,
19 It should be recalled that in the simulations each vehicle moves with a constant velocity,
which is a random variable uniformly distributed between 0.9v and 1.1v (the mean speed,
v, is varied from from 1 to 120 km/h). This causes that in those scenarios where the mean
speed (v) is higher, the relative speed of two moving vehicles will be also higher. For
example, if v is 120 km/h, the speed of each vehicle is uniformly distributed between 108
and 132 km/h, so the relative velocity of two vehicles may be up to 24 km/h.
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Figure 9. Average Care-of Route length.
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Figure 10. Average frequency of route changes.
since it is more difficult to establish a route within the VANET, unless the two MRs
can communicate directly. Vehicle speed also has an impact on the length of the
route, at faster speeds the Care-of Route length increases (the reason for that is the
same that the one for the increment in the acquisition time explained above).
From the obtained average number of hops involved in a Care-of Route, it may be
deduced that VARON, although it is not designed to explicitly find the shortest path
in terms of number of hops, usually finds the shortest route, since the first CoRTI
received at the target MR normally travels along the shortest path (this may not
be true in situations of network congestion, where the fastest path may not be the
shortest). Therefore, VARON seems to perform well at finding the shortest Care-of
Route.
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Figure 11. Average Care-of Route data packet fraction.
Figure 10 shows the average frequency of route changes, that is the number of
times during the lifetime of a communication flow that the route used to forward
the packets switches from a Care-of Route to the Home Route, and vice-versa. This
metric is important in order to evaluate the stability of the optimised Care-of routes.
Obtained results show that the frequency of route changes grows when the vehicle
density decreases, which is an expected behaviour, since in highly populated sce-
narios the Care-of Route average length is small, so it is less probable that the route
changes because there are less involved MRs. In very low populated scenarios, the
frequency of route changes decreases, because it is less likely that a Care-of Route
can be established and used, and therefore the number of route changes is smaller
(i.e. most of the times traffic is forwarded through the Home Route).
Figure 11 shows the average Care-of Route data packet fraction, which is the frac-
tion of delivered packets that are received through a Care-of Route. Therefore, this
metric represents the likelihood of optimising the traffic by using the VANET. Ob-
tained results show that there are more opportunities of optimising a communica-
tion in high populated scenarios and that the speed have also a small effect on the
probability of establishing a Care-of Route (in highly mobile scenarios the proba-
bility is lower). This result is also expected, since in those situations where a small
number of hops is required to communicate two MRs, it is easier to set-up a Care-of
Route, which is, moreover, more stable.
Figure 12 shows the average end-to-end TCP throughput obtained results 20 . In
order to compare the performance obtained by VARON with other approaches, the
20 In the experiments, the following configuration was used on the nodes: a TCP receive
buffer size of 87380 bytes and the TCP Window Scale option enabled. This represents
a standard TCP configuration nowadays (this is the default configuration of a Linux-2.6
machine).
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TCP throughput obtained with the NEMO Basic Support protocol and MIRON are
also shown. Figure 12(a) shows the results when VARON is enabled in the vehicles.
The TCP throughput decreases with decreasing vehicle density, since in scenarios
with low population of vehicles, it is harder to set-up a Care-of Route, longer paths
(see Figure 9) are usually required, and the configured routes have short lifetimes
(see Figure 10). As it was shown in Figure 11, this leads to a low fraction of data
traffic being sent through the VANET, and therefore the overall performance is
poor. Besides, the fact of not having implemented the detection of broken routes has
also an impact on the obtained TCP throughput, since the packet loss – that may be
experienced when a route breaks until it is deleted from the IP routing table (after
its expiration) – makes TCP congestion protocol reduce its transmission rate 21 .
Actually, for very low vehicle densities, the performance obtained with the NEMO
Basic Support protocol (approximately 275 kbit/s, as shown in Figure 12(b)) or
MIRON (approximately 300 kbit/s, as shown in Figure 12(c)) is better than with
VARON. However, obtained results show that for scenarios not so low populated
– as urban or even inter-urban scenarios, where vehicles are typically distributed
within roads with inter-vehicle distances of less than 150 m – VARON outperforms
both NEMO Basic Support protocol and MIRON. For high vehicle densities (e.g.,
traffic jams), the TCP throughput obtained with VARON is close to 1 Mbit/s, which
is a great improvement over the non vehicular optimised protocols (NEMO and
MIRON). This improvement is provided by VARON because of two main reasons:
• VARON enables the use of a VANET network built using an access technol-
ogy – such as IEEE 802.11 – that typically has more bandwidth that the access
technology used by a vehicle to connect to the Internet (e.g., GPRS/UMTS).
• VARON enables direct data packet forwarding within the VANET, avoiding to
use the infrastructure network and therefore reducing drastically the end-to-end
delay. Since TCP performance is heavily dependent on the round trip time (RTT)
between the communication peers, this end-to-end delay reduction contributes to
the TCP throughput improvement.
The last simulated metric was the signalling load introduced by VARON. Figure
13 shows the signalling load, measured both in bytes and packets. Obtained results
show that the overhead introduced by VARON, because of periodic HoAA mes-
sages and the Care-of Route discovery, is not negligible. VARON’s byte signalling
load (shown in Figure 13(a)) reaches almost 70% in low populated and high speed
scenarios, although it is about 20% for the rest of the scenarios (e.g., urban and
inter-urban). Results show that there is a constant amount of overhead caused by
the periodic HoAA flooding, but the main contribution to this overhead comes from
the Care-of Route discovery and set-up signalling.
21 The retransmission threshold behaviour used in the simulations was configured accord-
ing to the TCP standard and ensuring that connections could not break because of excessive
retransmission attempts.
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Figure 12. Average end-to-end TCP throughput (standard TCP configuration).
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Figure 13. Average VARON signalling.
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Although VARON’s byte signalling is not negligible, it is relatively low in most of
the scenarios. VARON’s packet overhead (shown in Figure 13(b)) results show that
VARON requires a great amount of small signalling packets to work (the number
of received VARON signalling packets even reaches 35 times the number of data
packets in the worst case scenario). This is caused by the periodic HoAA flooding
and also by the flooding nature of the Care-of Route discovery signalling. Besides,
the same signalling is required periodically to refresh an already established route.
VARON’s overhead may seem to be very high and therefore it may be argued that
it is not a good optimisation mechanism. However, there are several considerations
that should be taken into account:
• Almost all the signalling required by VARON is sent through the ad-hoc inter-
face. This interface is not used to send non optimised regular traffic and it has
typically no cost associated. It may be argued that sending so many packets im-
poses a non negligible energy cost, but in vehicles this cost is not so important,
since they have a powerful and rechargeable source of energy. On the other hand,
the computational cost associated to sending this signalling may have an impact
on the overall performance of the Mobile Router. Simulations have taken into ac-
count the cost associated to the cryptographic computations performed on each
packet, but forwarding a packet has also a cost, that depending on the MR’s ca-
pabilities may be relevant.
• The VARON simulated model does not implement the detection of broken links
and the CoRE associated signalling. By implementing this missing part, other
configuration parameters – such as the periodic timers involved in the Care-of
Route discovery and refreshment – could be set to less aggressive values (in
terms of periodicity and, therefore, associated overhead). The refreshment of a
Care-of Route – through periodic CoRTI/CoRT signalling – could even be re-
moved if the algorithm followed to detect broken links is good enough and en-
sures that all broken links can be detected. If not, it could always be optimised,
for example by not re-doing the full Care-of Route discovery process (that in-
volves a partial flooding of the VANET), but just sending a probe packet through
the established Care-of Route to check if it is still working.
Although graphs only display average values for the different simulated metrics, the
normalised standard deviation has also been calculated. Obtained results show that
the normalised standard deviation is higher in the low populated and high mobile
scenarios than in the high populated and low mobile scenarios, meaning that former
scenarios are more unstable than the latter ones.
One important conclusion that can be drawn from the simulation work is that in
highly mobile and low populated scenarios, it is more difficult to set-up a multi-
hop route between two vehicles, mainly because of the instability in the ad-hoc
routing. Therefore, most of the chances of communication involve routes with a
very low number of hops. An example of communication scenario that will greatly
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benefit from VARON optimisations would be that of military convoys or emergency
service operations, where a group of vehicles move together.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the problem of enabling communications from and
between vehicles. A first step is the provision of connectivity to the Internet. Cars
will likely have specialised devices (Mobile Routers) that will provide network
access to the rest of the devices in the car, i.e. the car will contain a Mobile Net-
work. For this reason we propose the application of Network Mobility solutions
to this scenario. The NEMO Basic Support protocol is the straightforward option.
The performance limitations of this scenario can be partially overcome through the
application of a NEMO Route Optimisation solution.
In this paper we have proposed VARON, a solution that enables optimal direct
vehicle-to-vehicle communication, using an ad-hoc network. VARON benefits from
the simultaneous reachability of vehicles through the infrastructure and the ad-hoc
network to secure the communications in the ad-hoc part. Although the proposed
solution does not preclude the possibility of performing some Denial of Service
attacks, that are inherent to the ad-hoc environment, these attacks only affect the
ad-hoc route and the vehicles can always fall back on the communication through
the infrastructure if needed. The benefit of the proposed mechanism is a clear im-
provement in end-to-end throughput and delay with security guarantees similar to
those available in infrastructure communications.
The proposed protocol has been validated and evaluated through extensive simula-
tion conducted with OPNET. Results show that VARON improves significantly the
performance in terms of TCP throughput when compared to other approaches such
as the use of plain NEMO Basic Support protocol or a generic Route Optimisation
solution for NEMO – such as MIRON – not suited for vehicular environments in
which cars obtain Internet access from low-bandwidth and high-delay access tech-
nology (e.g., GPRS/UMTS). Simulation has also shown that in highly mobile and
low populated scenarios, the probability of using the VANET to route traffic is low,
because of the instability in the ad-hoc routing. Most of the opportunities of opti-
mised communication involve routes with a very low number of hops (less than 5
hops). Hence, scenarios such as urban and inter-urban communications (e.g., traffic
jams, vehicles in a motorway) may greatly benefit from deploying VARON, espe-
cially in the case of a group of vehicles moving together, such as military convoys
or emergency service operations. On the other hand, it is not worth using VARON
in highly mobile and low populated scenarios – such as highways – since the prob-
ability of optimising a communication is very low and its lifetime would be very
short.
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Although the paper has presented VARON as a solution suited for vehicular envi-
ronments, its applicability is not limited to that scenario. Actually, any scenarios
involving mobile networks that are able to set-up an ad-hoc network, are good can-
didates for VARON deployment. For example, passengers on a train carrying their
Personal Area Networks (PANs) may be using peer-to-peer file sharing or Instant
Messaging (IM) applications while travelling (e.g., by using a PDA or laptop con-
nected to a mobile phone with 3G and WLAN capabilities acting as the Mobile
Router). If the two users involved in the peer-to-peer communication are located
within the same train, their MRs may decide to bypass the routing infrastructure
and directly send their traffic using a direct ad-hoc communication.
An interesting issue that we have not analysed in this paper is the applicability of
VARON to provide Route Optimisation in nested NEMO scenarios. Additionally,
when VARON is not used in vehicular environments, the power consumption of
the solution may be an issue, and therefore it is interesting to study how VARON
performs in battery-limited environments. We are currently working on both topics
in order to understand if VARON applicability can be also extended to these two
scenarios.
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